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Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the sub- 
ject-matter admits of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all 
discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts .... In the 
same spirit, therefore, should each type of statement be received; for it is 
the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things 
just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally 
foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to de- 
mand from a rhetorician scientific proofs. 
Aristotle (McKeon 1992: 329) 
It is sometimes said, either irritably or with a certain satisfaction, that 
philosophy makes no  progress. It is certainly true, and I think this is an 
abiding and not regrettable characteristic of the discipline, that philoso- 
phy has in a sense to keep trying to return to the beginning: a thing 
which is not at all easy to do. 
Iris Murdoch (1970: 1 )  
IF ANTHROPOLOGY is to contribute anything distinctly its own to a discussion 
of causality, the contribution will best come through its specialization in 
culture. An anthropologist would not be your first choice for statistical ad- 
vice on the applicability of discrete- or continuous-time models in an event- 
history analysis. Even in the most elementary quantitative applications, an- 
thropological texts defer to the work of more expertly trained others (Thomas 
1976; Bernard 1988). Fortunately, demographers want anthropological in- 
sights in precisely those areas of cultural meaning about which they as- 
sume anthropologists are most prepared to speak. The general understand- 
ing, mostly unstated, is that anthropologists have a set of procedures and 
understandings that enable them to make interpretations of the meanings 
of variables with a degree of reliability that untrained others lack. Along 
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with that faith goes the also unstated understanding that the concept called 
“culture” is underlain by a long history of shared and increasingly perfected 
definitional rigor. 
It is something of a shock for those from outside anthropology, then, 
to discover the near chaos of argument on just what culture is, much less 
the proper approaches to studying it. Eugene Hammel‘s influential 1990 
article, “A theory of culture for demography,” lifted the lid off the current 
state of those arguments within anthropology. Rhetorically powerful, fun 
to read, and often on the mark, it is one of the best surveys of the culture 
concept available to demography. It is also profoundly pessimistic in that it 
declares the two things that demographers have most wanted from anthro- 
pology, a theory of motivation for behavior and a theory of the meaningful 
contexts in which behavior occurs, to be the very two things they cannot 
have (1990: 466467).  
David Kertzer followed this essay a few years later (1997) with his 
own review of some of the same material. He placed the central tensions 
into the dichotomy between exclusively economic or exclusively cultural 
theories of causality. Against these, Kertzer suggested the possibility of a 
“third way“ that seems to disavow the value of interpretive approaches to 
culture represented, despite all their differences, by Clifford Geertz and his 
intellectual descendents. 
My own work bears some of the characteristics that Hammel and 
Kertzer criticize. That is, I believe demographers are asking exactly the right 
questions of anthropology-though they may not like the implications of 
the answers, Many interpretive approaches are representative of some of 
the best of what anthropology has to offer to our understanding of causal- 
ity in demographic processes. This follows from how we understand cau- 
sality itself. Much of the literature has to do with bolstering the analyst’s 
surety that the correlations between variables are not spurious, but all agree 
with the most basic point that such analysis ”cannot be directly used to 
establish causality because. ..correlations merely measure covariation” 
(Blalock 1972: 442). In other words, all arguments about causality involve 
interpretive decisions. This is probably too elementary to belabor, but it opens 
the window for using specific ideas about culture in ways that can be ap- 
plied to demographic problems. 
My argument assumes that we want to know how those processes work 
in particular settings. To the extent that what we seek to understand involves 
a particular place and particular people, interpretation is a necessary part of 
that understanding. This sketch is quickly outlined as follows: the only en- 
during contribution that cultural anthropology can make to demographic re- 
search is in terms of meaning, which implies interpretation; the best inter- 
pretive models available are expressed in terms of patterns of meaning and 
motivation; these models, like all others, are not independent of a view of 
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human beings; this view of the subject may have implications for our rules of 
argument and for defending the validity of any particular causal explanation. 
Anthropological contributions 
The history of anthropological demography suggests that, lacking a theory 
of culture, anthropology’s contribution to demography could be reduced to 
the recruitment of high-priced area and language specialists as adjuncts to 
larger projects. Other than the area specializations, it is largely through the 
introduction of cultural issues that anthropology offers additional insight 
into demographic analysis. Looking at the range of studies that exist, and 
recognizing that any single study crosses categories, reveals three general 
kinds of anthropological contribution: ( 1 ) the replication of standard de- 
mographic data collection and analysis among small, exotic, or hard-to-reach 
populations; (2) the reinterpretation of existing survey data and the addi- 
tion of new, locally relevant variables to social surveys; and (3) the applica- 
tion of cultural understandings and contexts to strategies of data collection 
and analysis. Examples of the first might include early work by British an- 
thropologists in Africa (Fortes 1943; Barnes 1949) and more recent work 
by scholars such as Alan Fix (1977) and Nancy Howell (1979); of the sec- 
ond, work from Pakistan (Fricke, Syed, and Smith 1986), Africa (Lesthaeghe 
1989), and Taiwan (Thornton and Lin 1994); and of the third, a wide and 
disparate set with examples in edited volumes such as Greenhalgh (1995a) 
and Kertzer and Fricke ( 1997). 
Of the three kinds of contribution, the first has declined in dominance 
as well-conceived social surveys are able to be carried out in increasingly 
remote settings (Axinn, Barber, and Ghimire 1997). The second two have 
correspondingly risen in importance, their distinguishing feature being that 
both demand the cultural expertise of the anthropologist to be at all effec- 
tive. We are faced, then, with needing a definition of culture that is both, 
pace Hammel, useful for demography and true to its subject. 
In my own work (most explicitly in 1997a, 1997b), I have argued that 
the most useful theory of culture for demography would begin from mod- 
els that take it as defining the world of action and providing the motiva- 
tions for action in that world. Not only are these exactly the areas that 
Hammel has diagnosed as being of greatest interest to demographers them- 
selves, but they are also elements embedded in several definitions of cul- 
ture by anthropologists. These anthropologists include some of greater and 
lesser theoretical currency, from the now 30-year-old statement by Clifford 
Geertz that takes culture as models of and for reality (1973) to more recent 
work by cognitive anthropologists (D’Andrade 1995; Strauss and Quinn 
1998). The points made independently and vigorously by such writers as 
Hammel (1990), Kertzer (1997), and Greenhalgh (1995b) concerning the 
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labile and shifting nature of cultural meanings are not inherently incom- 
patible with this kind of orientation to culture. Nor are their criticisms of 
some of the more serious misuses of "culture" in multivariate models. It is 
nevertheless also important to stress that there must be some minimal level 
of stability in the shared understandings and the bounds of groups within 
which these understandings hold to maintain social discourse. The extent 
of that stability is what may determine how these understandings can be 
used in particular causal arguments, but these are the things that require 
case-by-case argument. 
Many practitioners associated with interpretive theories of culture would 
themselves be uncomfortable with the application of their understandings of 
culture to multivariate causal analyses. Some of that discomfort must derive 
from the procedural assumptions of much empirical social science, assump- 
tions which imply a view of the person that is strikingly at odds with most of 
our own experiences of everyday lie. This suggests that the use of these models 
may have implications for how strongly we assert the necessity of certain 
procedural rules, most of which were developed and later enshrined to pro- 
vide interpretive assurance across the empirical divide that separates causa- 
tion in the world from our ideas about it (Menand 2001: 262). 
The dilemma of culture is that, unlike those causal relationships in 
which an external force or agent moves an object, culture is a context of 
understanding and motivation that must be inside of the person. If we see 
culture as an external force, then we are unable to account for its fluidity 
and openness to change. If we fail to see it as internalized in human beings 
who need to operate in terms of continuity and common understandings, 
then we risk losing insights into its ability to endure through time. This 
isn't the place to discuss that process of internalization except to say that 
we have a reasonable understanding of how a person grows into a culture 
in our theories of human development, socialization, and enculturation. In 
some ways, culture gets into us as does a habit. 
Thinking of culture this way gets us out of the problem of using it in 
the old determinative ways of sets of laws or norms, approaches Hammel 
called "mired in structural-functional concepts that are about 40 years old, 
hardening rapidly, and showing every sign of fossilization" (1990: 456). It 
gets us thinking in complex ways about how frameworks of meaning pro- 
vide a logic for human action in the concrete circumstances and histories of 
real actors. There is room simultaneously for life course theories and their 
variables, political economic theories and their variables, and interpretive 
understandings of culture. But, at the same time, there are implications for 
how we develop our hypotheses and defend our explanations. Let me give 
examples in two areas of concern for demography, aggregate and individual- 
level analyses, both of which make use of this idea of culture as frame of 
meaning and motivation. 
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Aggregate explanation 
It is easy enough to invoke culture for the aggregate-level differences we 
notice in demographic phenomena across groups. The groups are usually 
defined by either geography or ethnicity or, more questionably, religion, 
and often by a combination of these. An older causal use of these variables 
might be summarized as “These X kind of people have more children or 
marry younger because their culture has norms or rules that tell them to 
behave this way.“ 
A more subtle way of using these variables might be to notice a social 
practice, cross-cousin marriage for example, that is more prevalent in popu- 
lation X than population Y. Tim Dyson and Mick Moore (1983) did some- 
thing like this in an extremely valuable comparison of North and South 
India that focused on women’s status as linked to systems of marriage, mak- 
ing that the proximate cause for later ages at marriage and lower fertility in 
South India than in the North. 
A cultural explanation in terms of frameworks of meaning and moti- 
vation might go a step further and argue that in those areas with cross- 
cousin marriage systems an ethos of reciprocal alliances operates as a gov- 
erning framework for interpreting and motivating behaviors. That system 
has important connections to the symbolic role of marriage in those alli- 
ances, to the continuing identity of women with respect to their natal fami- 
lies after marriage, and to the degree to which the families and even whole 
lineages united by marriage exchanges see themselves as sharing ancestry. 
It actually gets much more complex than this. Although I have not worked 
in South India, my generalizations come from my own fieldwork in an- 
other population favoring cross-cousin marriage and my knowledge of eth- 
nographies about other settings. North Indian populations could very crudely 
be contrasted with South Indian on these same dimensions. 
The point here is not to play this out in detail but to denote the gen- 
eral emphasis on meaning. My point about the potential problems of reli- 
gion used in this general way is that religions often cross regions with vastly 
different cultural systems in other respects. And this suggests a crucial prob- 
lem with identifying the bounds of cultural context. This is an empirical 
problem, but still very real: How do we comfortably bound populations for 
whom we can say that the attributes of culture are shared? On the one 
hand, we want to be able to say something that applies to a bounded group; 
on the other, we are in constant danger of committing the ecological fal- 
lacy. This seems to be a problem with any aggregate analysis, but saying 
this does not make the problem go away. In anthropological circles, these 
kinds of arguments run the serious risk of ”essentializing” people, and here 
again is the concern for choosing framing elements of meaning that can be 
plausibly defended. 
T O M  F R I C K E  475 
Individual explanation 
Pulling this perspective down to the individual level will help to make the 
point that quite concrete measures can be interpreted in cultural terms. One 
of the classic “modernization” variables in the demographic analysis of age 
at marriage is education. Across the world few relationships are more con- 
sistent than the positive one between these two measures: any schooling at 
all seems to be related to later ages at marriage; and the higher the school- 
ing levels, the greater the age at marriage. Nevertheless, our understanding 
of this relationship is deeply interpretive. We rarely say “education causes 
later marriage” and leave it at that. Older demographic transition theory 
took education to be an indicator of modernization and argued that it was 
correlated with secularization, increased rationality, and heightened indi- 
vidual autonomy. Even the successors to this theory seldom question the 
common meaning of education across settings. Their interpretations of its 
impact on other variables may differ, as for example when they suggest 
that parental desires to educate their children keep the latter out of the 
marriage market longer. The explanations for a positive relationship be- 
tween age at marriage and educational attainment have two basic forms in 
these different approaches. One focuses on the autonomy it confers on in- 
dividual children (modernization theory) and the other allows for parental 
controls over the marriage timing of children but suggests a fairly mechani- 
cal relationship between the incompatibility of schooling and marriage. 
But neither of these explanations is concerned with the specific mean- 
ing of education in context, and this might vary considerably across set- 
tings. In our analysis of survey data from rural Punjabi villages, my col- 
leagues and I (Fricke, Syed, and Smith 1986) noted that a woman’s education 
had the usual positive relationship with age at marriage even when con- 
trols for numerous other individual characteristics were accounted for. An 
analyst might be tempted to interpret these results in terms of a moderniza- 
tion framework: education leads to greater autonomy, which leads to more 
control over one’s destiny and results in higher ages at marriage. But the 
results also show that the substantial fraction of women who attended school 
only briefly, without completing a year, marry at later ages than those who 
never attended school at all. 
Neither demographic transition theory’s explanation nor the incompat- 
ibility explanation works for these relationships. My coauthors and I argued 
that the relationship could not be understood without reference to highly 
specific features of the local context. We argued that education had become 
part of a larger world of symbolic indicators of status and that any schooling 
at all conferred a standing on the natal family of a woman and allowed them 
to wait longer to marry off their daughter since this status counterbalanced 
the loss of a woman’s value in marriage as a result of increasing age. 
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We noted that the relationship between education and employment 
was hardly relevant here. Women in this setting were not likely to be seri- 
ous supporters of their families in monetary work, certainly not in mon- 
etary work requiring education. We also noted that all marriages in this set- 
ting were arranged. The failure of standard explanations that ignored context 
caused us to turn to the ethnographic literature on Punjabi marriages. We 
focused on literature that discussed marriage within the context of wider 
relationships organized by family and kinship, including material on the sym- 
bolic significance of women, the relation between person and group, the 
social organization of marriage, prestige systems, and cultural theories of 
personhood and gender. Our interpretation of education as a marker of qual- 
ity, influencing the desirability of connections between families organized 
by marriage, placed the experience of schooling within a wider array of pres- 
tige markers that play a part in marriage negotiation. The actual educational 
content, and the implications for autonomy in a setting where no woman 
chooses her own spouse, were secondary to our thinking. 
Our examination of schooling converted the measure from a story about 
education to a culturally meaningful symbol that made a statement about a 
woman’s family. In so doing, we drastically altered the possible interpreta- 
tion of an empirical relationship. In the same way any researcher is con- 
cerned with plausibility, our interpretation trumped received models de- 
void of cultural content because it more coherently accounted for what was 
anomalous in these other models. It did so, moreover, using a framework 
that established a consistent culture-based story for all other variables in 
the analysis. 
The nature of the subject 
There are, of course, no neutral ways of approaching the human subject 
(Putnam 2002). Each approach implies an underlying orientation; and, con- 
versely, to argue for an orientation or that some characteristics are more 
essentially human than others is to argue that some approaches are better 
attuned to these characteristics than others. Those discussions of research 
design that suggest otherwise-that one can leave out the “philosophical” 
issues to arrive at sound method (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994)-need 
to ask how standardizing analytic procedures across all cases may inadvert- 
ently impoverish understanding. Iris Murdoch argued that her objection to 
a particular image of the human subject prevalent in analytic strategies was 
empirical, philosophical, and moral all at once ( 1970: 8-9). 
Many discussions of culture and meaning have a disembodied and ab- 
stract quality. They favor principle and abstraction to such an extent that it 
is easy to forget that understanding a human subject is the reason for the 
discussion at all. One advantage of the interpretive orientation is that it makes 
it harder to lose sight of this. Charles Taylor, a key source for this orienta- 
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tion, suggests that the essential character of the human subject is the ca- 
pacity for self-interpretation and action in terms of meaning. For him, “hu- 
man behavior seen as action of agents who desire and are moved, who have 
goals and aspirations, necessarily offers a purchase for descriptions in terms 
of meaning” (Taylor 1985: 27). 
It is true, as Hammel implies, that we cannot get inside people’s heads 
to actually know what motivates them or how they see the world. It is true, 
in other words, that we operate in terms of theories. But this is the same 
context within which we live our everyday lives. If I ask myself the ques- 
tion in my everyday dealings with people, “Why did she do that?,” I seek 
an answer as an attempt to understand that person’s view of the world, her 
motivations, and the concrete circumstances of a situation. I acknowledge, 
if I want to get as close to the true reasons as possible, that I might be wrong 
in my interpretation and that more information, or the reach for more con- 
sistency in light of the available information, may cause me to modify my 
initial understanding. If the thing I seek to explain is important, or if the 
person is particularly important to me, I may try to include information 
about her past history and wider networks of kin and association. 
In some ways, anthropological fieldwork replicates this prosaic opera- 
tion of the everyday. Our attempts at understanding are imaginative acts in 
which we try to get inside of the head of the cultural other. More concretely, 
when we try to generalize about systems of meaning and motivation or try to 
think about what we need to know to explain the causes of a behavior or 
event in a given setting, we have real people in mind. The experience of the 
field seems to reduce procedural worries. An especially pertinent example 
for demography is John Caldwell, whose account of his movement into eth- 
nographic forms of study (1982: 3-5) has the feel of conversion. His experi- 
ence of “becoming intimately acquainted with each village and its families” 
( 1982: 4) underwrites his subsequent flexibility in approaches to deriving con- 
clusions from field data (Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1988: 68). 
Some implications 
It may seem that these comments have wandered far from the issue of cau- 
sality. For those who want to hold to the technical and restricted sense 
(Rosenberg 1968: lo),  this may be the case. But since, “empirically, we 
can.. .never prove that the connection between two variables is necessary” 
(Blalock 1972: 449; cf. Menand 2001: 262 on David Hume), the discussion 
of causality necessarily takes us into what Blalock has called theoretical lan- 
guage, in this case a meta-theoretical language that suggests that the inter- 
pretation of variables may not be as straightforward as we would like. 
Hammel’s point that there are no independent measures of meaning or mo- 
tivation is a recognition that what goes on inside a person’s head is ulti- 
mately private. This seems irreducibly so. 
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Yet, if causal relations are themselves unobservable, then the proce- 
dures we use to explore causality are themselves conventions developed 
and sustained because they have worked so well for certain kinds of prob- 
lems. To suggest this much is not to argue that they are without value, but 
to open the possibility to alternative procedures. Aristotle’s point in the epi- 
graph was at least partly to argue that method and expectation should be 
appropriate to the subject. It may be that those procedures that work well 
in natural sciences-where the subjects are not self-reflective, conscious, 
and moral beings, as interpretive approaches to the human sciences im- 
ply-are too confining for the study of causality in human beings (Taylor 
1964, 1985). 
The unobservability of causal relations means that our conventions 
for arguing them are another “trick of the trade,” as Howard Becker argues 
(1998: 63-66). Descriptions of culture are necessarily descriptions of sys- 
tems of meaning requiring different criteria of validity than the causal ex- 
planations appropriate to individual variation. The primary criterion of an 
adequate description is its coherence (Taylor 1985). 
This may be the most difficult characteristic of this approach to cul- 
ture and causality for demographers to accept. It requires a different form 
of argument and greater openness to reformulation than is typical for the 
usual analytic verifications of quantitative analyses. Its rewards are found 
in more nuanced and contextualized discussions of meaning based on local 
criteria and, ultimately, the people who are themselves the subject of study. 
Note 
Many thanks to Christine Bachrach for her 
prescient organization of the session at the 
Annual Meeting of the Population Associa- 
tion of America (May 2003, Minneapolis) for 
which this comment was crafted. And spe- 
cia1 thanks to her and the session discussant, 
Geoffrey McNicoll, for their probing, witty, 
and elegant comments on  the draft manu- 
script. William Axinn, Jennifer Barber, Rob- 
ert Moffitt, Nancy Riley, Herbert Smith, and 
Arland Thornton also sparked ideas and re- 
visions. 
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